Apply these security standards when writing or reviewing code.
| # | Vulnerability | Key Prevention |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Deny by default, enforce server-side, verify ownership |
| A02 | Security Misconfiguration | Harden configs, disable defaults, minimize features |
| A03 | Supply Chain Failures | Lock versions, verify integrity, audit dependencies |
| A04 | Cryptographic Failures | TLS 1.2+, AES-256-GCM, Argon2/bcrypt for passwords |
| A05 | Injection | Parameterized queries, input validation, safe APIs |
| A06 | Insecure Design | Threat model, rate limit, design security controls |
| A07 | Auth Failures | MFA, check breached passwords, secure sessions |
| A08 | Integrity Failures | Sign packages, SRI for CDN, safe serialization |
| A09 | Logging Failures | Log security events, structured format, alerting |
| A10 | Exception Handling | Fail-closed, hide internals, log with context |
When reviewing code, check for these issues:
# UNSAFE
cursor.execute(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = {user_id}")
# SAFE
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = %s", (user_id,))
# UNSAFE
os.system(f"convert {filename} output.png")
# SAFE
subprocess.run(["convert", filename, "output.png"], shell=False)
# UNSAFE
hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()
# SAFE
from argon2 import PasswordHasher
PasswordHasher().hash(password)
# UNSAFE - No authorization check
@app.route('/api/user/<user_id>')
def get_user(user_id):
return db.get_user(user_id)
# SAFE - Authorization enforced
@app.route('/api/user/<user_id>')
@login_required
def get_user(user_id):
if current_user.id != user_id and not current_user.is_admin:
abort(403)
return db.get_user(user_id)
# UNSAFE - Exposes internals
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle_error(e):
return str(e), 500
# SAFE - Fail-closed, log context
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle_error(e):
error_id = uuid.uuid4()
logger.exception(f"Error {error_id}: {e}")
return {"error": "An error occurred", "id": str(error_id)}, 500
# UNSAFE - Fail-open
def check_permission(user, resource):
try:
return auth_service.check(user, resource)
except Exception:
return True # DANGEROUS!
# SAFE - Fail-closed
def check_permission(user, resource):
try:
return auth_service.check(user, resource)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Auth check failed: {e}")
return False # Deny on error
When building or reviewing AI agent systems, check for:
| Risk | Description | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| ASI01: Goal Hijack | Prompt injection alters agent objectives | Input sanitization, goal boundaries, behavioral monitoring |
| ASI02: Tool Misuse | Tools used in unintended ways | Least privilege, fine-grained permissions, validate I/O |
| ASI03: Privilege Abuse | Credential escalation across agents | Short-lived scoped tokens, identity verification |
| ASI04: Supply Chain | Compromised plugins/MCP servers | Verify signatures, sandbox, allowlist plugins |
| ASI05: Code Execution | Unsafe code generation/execution | Sandbox execution, static analysis, human approval |
| ASI06: Memory Poisoning | Corrupted RAG/context data | Validate stored content, segment by trust level |
| ASI07: Agent Comms | Spoofing between agents | Authenticate, encrypt, verify message integrity |
| ASI08: Cascading Failures | Errors propagate across systems | Circuit breakers, graceful degradation, isolation |
| ASI09: Trust Exploitation | Social engineering via AI | Label AI content, user education, verification steps |
| ASI10: Rogue Agents | Compromised agents acting maliciously | Behavior monitoring, kill switches, anomaly detection |
Important: The examples below are illustrative starting points, not exhaustive. When reviewing code, think like a senior security researcher: consider the language’s memory model, type system, standard library pitfalls, ecosystem-specific attack vectors, and historical CVE patterns. Each language has deeper quirks beyond what’s listed here.
Different languages have unique security pitfalls. Here are the top 20 languages with key security considerations. Go deeper for the specific language you’re working in:
Main Risks: Prototype pollution, XSS, eval injection
// UNSAFE: Prototype pollution
Object.assign(target, userInput);
// SAFE: Use null prototype or validate keys
Object.assign(Object.create(null), validated);
// UNSAFE: eval injection
eval(userCode);
// SAFE: Never use eval with user input
Watch for: eval(), innerHTML, document.write(), prototype chain manipulation, __proto__
Main Risks: Pickle deserialization, format string injection, shell injection
# UNSAFE: Pickle RCE
pickle.loads(user_data)
# SAFE: Use JSON or validate source
json.loads(user_data)
# UNSAFE: Format string injection
query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '%s'" % user_input
# SAFE: Parameterized
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = %s", (user_input,))
Watch for: pickle, eval(), exec(), os.system(), subprocess with shell=True
Main Risks: Deserialization RCE, XXE, JNDI injection
// UNSAFE: Arbitrary deserialization
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(userStream);
Object obj = ois.readObject();
// SAFE: Use allowlist or JSON
ObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();
mapper.readValue(json, SafeClass.class);
Watch for: ObjectInputStream, Runtime.exec(), XML parsers without XXE protection, JNDI lookups
Main Risks: Deserialization, SQL injection, path traversal
// UNSAFE: BinaryFormatter RCE
BinaryFormatter bf = new BinaryFormatter();
object obj = bf.Deserialize(stream);
// SAFE: Use System.Text.Json
var obj = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<SafeType>(json);
Watch for: BinaryFormatter, JavaScriptSerializer, TypeNameHandling.All, raw SQL strings
Main Risks: Type juggling, file inclusion, object injection
// UNSAFE: Type juggling in auth
if ($password == $stored_hash) { ... }
// SAFE: Use strict comparison
if (hash_equals($stored_hash, $password)) { ... }
// UNSAFE: File inclusion
include($_GET['page'] . '.php');
// SAFE: Allowlist pages
$allowed = ['home', 'about']; include(in_array($page, $allowed) ? "$page.php" : 'home.php');
Watch for: == vs ===, include/require, unserialize(), preg_replace with /e, extract()
Main Risks: Race conditions, template injection, slice bounds
// UNSAFE: Race condition
go func() { counter++ }()
// SAFE: Use sync primitives
atomic.AddInt64(&counter, 1)
// UNSAFE: Template injection
template.HTML(userInput)
// SAFE: Let template escape
Watch for: Goroutine data races, template.HTML(), unsafe package, unchecked slice access
Main Risks: Mass assignment, YAML deserialization, regex DoS
# UNSAFE: Mass assignment
User.new(params[:user])
# SAFE: Strong parameters
User.new(params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email))
# UNSAFE: YAML RCE
YAML.load(user_input)
# SAFE: Use safe_load
YAML.safe_load(user_input)
Watch for: YAML.load, Marshal.load, eval, send with user input, .permit!
Main Risks: Unsafe blocks, FFI boundary issues, integer overflow in release
// CAUTION: Unsafe bypasses safety
unsafe { ptr::read(user_ptr) }
// CAUTION: Release integer overflow
let x: u8 = 255;
let y = x + 1; // Wraps to 0 in release!
// SAFE: Use checked arithmetic
let y = x.checked_add(1).unwrap_or(255);
Watch for: unsafe blocks, FFI calls, integer overflow in release builds, .unwrap() on untrusted input
Main Risks: Force unwrapping crashes, Objective-C interop
// UNSAFE: Force unwrap on untrusted data
let value = jsonDict["key"]!
// SAFE: Safe unwrapping
guard let value = jsonDict["key"] else { return }
// UNSAFE: Format string
String(format: userInput, args)
// SAFE: Don't use user input as format
Watch for: force unwrap (!), try!, ObjC bridging, NSSecureCoding misuse
Main Risks: Null safety bypass, Java interop, serialization
// UNSAFE: Platform type from Java
val len = javaString.length // NPE if null
// SAFE: Explicit null check
val len = javaString?.length ?: 0
// UNSAFE: Reflection
clazz.getDeclaredMethod(userInput)
// SAFE: Allowlist methods
Watch for: Java interop nulls (! operator), reflection, serialization, platform types
Main Risks: Buffer overflow, use-after-free, format string
// UNSAFE: Buffer overflow
char buf[10]; strcpy(buf, userInput);
// SAFE: Bounds checking
strncpy(buf, userInput, sizeof(buf) - 1);
// UNSAFE: Format string
printf(userInput);
// SAFE: Always use format specifier
printf("%s", userInput);
Watch for: strcpy, sprintf, gets, pointer arithmetic, manual memory management, integer overflow
Main Risks: XML external entities, serialization, pattern matching exhaustiveness
// UNSAFE: XXE
val xml = XML.loadString(userInput)
// SAFE: Disable external entities
val factory = SAXParserFactory.newInstance()
factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false)
Watch for: Java interop issues, XML parsing, Serializable, exhaustive pattern matching
Main Risks: Code injection, file path manipulation
# UNSAFE: eval injection
eval(parse(text = user_input))
# SAFE: Never parse user input as code
# UNSAFE: Path traversal
read.csv(paste0("data/", user_file))
# SAFE: Validate filename
if (grepl("^[a-zA-Z0-9]+\\.csv$", user_file)) read.csv(...)
Watch for: eval(), parse(), source(), system(), file path manipulation
Main Risks: Regex injection, open() injection, taint mode bypass
# UNSAFE: Regex DoS
$input =~ /$user_pattern/;
# SAFE: Use quotemeta
$input =~ /\Q$user_pattern\E/;
# UNSAFE: open() command injection
open(FILE, $user_file);
# SAFE: Three-argument open
open(my $fh, '<', $user_file);
Watch for: Two-arg open(), regex from user input, backticks, eval, disabled taint mode
Main Risks: Command injection, word splitting, globbing
# UNSAFE: Unquoted variables
rm $user_file
# SAFE: Always quote
rm "$user_file"
# UNSAFE: eval
eval "$user_command"
# SAFE: Never eval user input
Watch for: Unquoted variables, eval, backticks, $(...) with user input, missing set -euo pipefail
Main Risks: Sandbox escape, loadstring injection
-- UNSAFE: Code injection
loadstring(user_code)()
-- SAFE: Use sandboxed environment with restricted functions
Watch for: loadstring, loadfile, dofile, os.execute, io library, debug library
Main Risks: Atom exhaustion, code injection, ETS access
# UNSAFE: Atom exhaustion DoS
String.to_atom(user_input)
# SAFE: Use existing atoms only
String.to_existing_atom(user_input)
# UNSAFE: Code injection
Code.eval_string(user_input)
# SAFE: Never eval user input
Watch for: String.to_atom, Code.eval_string, :erlang.binary_to_term, ETS public tables
Main Risks: Platform channel injection, insecure storage
// UNSAFE: Storing secrets in SharedPreferences
prefs.setString('auth_token', token);
// SAFE: Use flutter_secure_storage
secureStorage.write(key: 'auth_token', value: token);
Watch for: Platform channel data, dart:mirrors, Function.apply, insecure local storage
Main Risks: Command injection, execution policy bypass
# UNSAFE: Injection
Invoke-Expression $userInput
# SAFE: Avoid Invoke-Expression with user data
# UNSAFE: Unvalidated path
Get-Content $userPath
# SAFE: Validate path is within allowed directory
Watch for: Invoke-Expression, & $userVar, Start-Process with user args, -ExecutionPolicy Bypass
Main Risks: Injection, privilege escalation, data exfiltration
-- UNSAFE: String concatenation
"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + userId
-- SAFE: Parameterized query (language-specific)
-- Use prepared statements in ALL cases
Watch for: Dynamic SQL, EXECUTE IMMEDIATE, stored procedures with dynamic queries, privilege grants
When reviewing any language, think like a senior security researcher:
For any language not listed: Research its specific CWE patterns, CVE history, and known footguns. The examples above are entry points, not complete coverage.
Use this skill when:
please fetch the most recent version of the OWASP top 10 list from their website: https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/